NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FILED

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

AUG 30 2006

CATHY A. CATTERSON, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

V.

NAI CHING SAELEE,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 05-30367

D.C. No. CR-04-00125-RRB

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Alaska Ralph R. Beistline, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted July 27, 2006 Anchorage, Alaska

Before: KOZINSKI, BERZON and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.

The full range of conduct covered by Alaska Stat. § 11.41.420 falls within the meaning of "crime of violence" as defined by the career offender enhancement provision of the Sentencing Guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2. And, where the full range of conduct covered by a statute fits within the meaning of "crime of

^{*} This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Cir. R. 36-3.

violence," an enhancement for violating the statute is proper. <u>See United States</u> v. <u>Baron-Medina</u>, 187 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 1999). Thus, the sentence enhancement for defendant's past sexual assault offense was appropriate.

Any activity covered under Alaska Stat. § 11.41.220(a), is likewise a "crime of violence" for the purposes of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2. Given that defendant was convicted of third-degree assault under Alaska Stat. § 11.41.220(a), his sentence was properly enhanced on this basis as well.

Where all conduct covered by the statute is a "crime of violence," a sentencing judge need not conduct a modified categorical analysis. <u>See United States v. Lopez-Torres</u>, 443 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006). And, because we hold that all activities covered by Alaska Statute § 11.41.220(a) are categorically "crimes of violence," the district judge's consultation of material other than "charging documents filed in the court of conviction" and "recorded judicial acts," as required by <u>Shepard v. United States</u>, 544 U.S. 13, 20 (2005), was harmless.

The record offers no suggestion that the trial court based its sentence on a determination that defendant possessed firearms in connection with another felony offense. Therefore, we will not review whether such a connection could be established in this case.

AFFIRMED.